Initial reactions
Since Thursday morning, thinking about the implications of the bombing in London has occupied most of my spare time. Here are a few thoughts:
Despite the best efforts of a few, the bombings are unlikely to be a catalyst for an anti-government backlash in particular, or an anti-Iraq backlash in general. George Galloway's statement to the House of Commons on Thursday - essentially that "Londoners have now paid the price of hte government ignoring" warnings that "the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq would increase the threat of a terrorist attack in Britain" - is said to have "angered many at Westminster," the Financial Times reports. Perhaps Labour's Liverpool anti-war MP Peter Kilfoyle was correct to say that "now is not the time" to discuss the matter. (Christopher Adams, FT, 8 July, p.5)
Galloway's comments have been echoed in numerous comment pieces in the last few days, however, with pieces by Tariq Ali in Friday's Guardian (p. 24), Robert Fisk in Friday's Independent (p. 33) and Dilip Hiro in Sunday's IoS (p. 30) all making similar points.
However, the sentiment hardly seems widespread. The editors of the Independent on Sunday seem to be mroe representative of the mood of most media commentators: "we accept that British troops should not have been withdrawn from Iraq after the invasion and should not be withdrawn now. As such, we have to face the terrorist threat squarely." (Leading Article, p. 27)
We can assume the arguments will be given a little more flesh and sophistication, especially if the bombers were British citizens (as former Met. Police Commissioner John Stevens suggested they "almost certainly" were in yesterday's News of the World - see James Blitz and Jimmy Burns, FT, 11 July, p. 2), but Polly Toynbee's argument on ID cards will very likely find widespread agreement: "ID cards may get an easier passage now that they can show a clearer purpose. Where the security services and intelligence plainly failed abysmally to detect any of hte elaborate planning for this atrocity, attention may turn to sterner measures against the hundreds of thousands of foreigners living here illegally." (Guardian, 8 July, p. 23)
More generally, Blair's popularity could well soar if he continues to be seen to have dealt well with the crisis, for reasons noted by James Blitz (FT, July 9/10, p. 13)
The comment pages of the Guardian/Observer have played host to an indirect ongoing discussion about Blair's responsibility for the attacks, with Nick Cohen preaching that because "Islamism was a reactionary movement as great as fascism," and moreover "an autonomous psychopathic force with reasons of its own," no responsibility for the attacks can be laid at the door of Number 10 (or the White House). Gary Younge responded today with a reiteration of the arguments set out by Ali, Fisk and Hiro. I doubt this debate will generate much interest - particularly as it was done to death in the weeks after 9/11. Perhaps, if it gains a sufficiently wide audience, the view of Robin Cook will gain some popularity. On Friday, he wrote: "So long as the struggle against terrorism is conceived as a war that can be won by military means, it is doomed to fail...Success will only come from isolating the terrorists and denying them support, funds and recruits, which means focusing more on our common ground with the Muslim world than on what divides us." Not too controversial, but still somewhat at odds with the "war on terror" generally. It won't have much impact, though, unless "attacks" are conceived much more broadly than the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (something on that scale is pretty unlikely for a few years, given the disastrous occupation of Iraq). The "attacks" as many supporters of the jihadis see them, include unflinching support for Israel, the close relationship with Saudi Arabia, and the attempts to undermine the democratic opposition in Iran. A radical reorientation in foreign policy is the natural conclusion to be drawn from Cook's proposals - something very different from the policy he pursued as Foreign Secretary, and something unlikely to emerge under a 'New' Labour government.
Jeffrey Sachs, blogging for the FT, praised Britain's response to the attacks on Friday, saying "There were no pogroms, attacks on London’s large Muslim population, Rather there were statements of praise for the Muslim community, for its integral role in London life. There was no rush to judgment, no bluster, no jingoism, only the steady voices of British politicians directing a democratic response to this most undemocratic of deeds." Others were not so confident - Jonathan Guthrie wrote that "The long-feared assault on the capital is predicted to trigger a resurgence in hostility towards Muslims that followed September 11." (FT, July 8, p. 5), suggesting the next day that "Reprisals [against British Muslims] could create a new generation of radicals" (Roula Khalaf and Jonathan Guthrie, FT, July 9/10, p. 7). Today it emerges that "hate crimes" against Muslims have already resulted in one "serious injury." (James Blitz and Jimmy Burns, FT, July 11, p. 2)
The attacks have almost totally overshadowed coverage of the G8 summit, leaving most ignorant of the lack of substance behind the propagandistic "pledges" on debt, world trade and climate change. "Campaigners who had backed Mr Blair's campaign to increase aid to Africa were disappointed, saying that much of the money was a restatement of existing pledges and that it fell far short of what was needed." (James Blitz, Alan Beattie and Fiona Harvey, FT, 9/10 July, p. 1). Reports on the agreements give ample scope for disappointment, but it is likely to remain confined to campaigners - the millions who enjoyed Live 8 are unlikely to notice their complaints in the sparse coverage. Dramatic progress in the near future seems rather unlikely, as WTO director-general Supachai Panitchpakdi warned "progress [on trade negotiations] is nowhere near sufficient in terms of our critical path to Hong Kong," which will host a WTO meeting in December. (Alan Beattie, FT, July 9/10, p. 8) If the already existing agenda of the Doha round cannot be agreed, then agreement on radical moves to seriously reduce poverty in the world's poorest countries look pretty unlikely - perhaps one reason for the weak deals made this week.
A more critical perspective might describe the whole affair as a sham.
Finally, two articles - one short one and one longer one - from Jason Burke, who well deserves his description on the Guardian website as "The world's leading expert on al-Qaeda." " Fundamentally, this is an amateurish, lo-tech operation. It indicates a small group who did what they could with limited resources available," he reckons. In this case, hopefully organising any more attacks in the near future will be beyond their capacity - we can only hope so.
Despite the best efforts of a few, the bombings are unlikely to be a catalyst for an anti-government backlash in particular, or an anti-Iraq backlash in general. George Galloway's statement to the House of Commons on Thursday - essentially that "Londoners have now paid the price of hte government ignoring" warnings that "the attacks on Afghanistan and Iraq would increase the threat of a terrorist attack in Britain" - is said to have "angered many at Westminster," the Financial Times reports. Perhaps Labour's Liverpool anti-war MP Peter Kilfoyle was correct to say that "now is not the time" to discuss the matter. (Christopher Adams, FT, 8 July, p.5)
Galloway's comments have been echoed in numerous comment pieces in the last few days, however, with pieces by Tariq Ali in Friday's Guardian (p. 24), Robert Fisk in Friday's Independent (p. 33) and Dilip Hiro in Sunday's IoS (p. 30) all making similar points.
However, the sentiment hardly seems widespread. The editors of the Independent on Sunday seem to be mroe representative of the mood of most media commentators: "we accept that British troops should not have been withdrawn from Iraq after the invasion and should not be withdrawn now. As such, we have to face the terrorist threat squarely." (Leading Article, p. 27)
We can assume the arguments will be given a little more flesh and sophistication, especially if the bombers were British citizens (as former Met. Police Commissioner John Stevens suggested they "almost certainly" were in yesterday's News of the World - see James Blitz and Jimmy Burns, FT, 11 July, p. 2), but Polly Toynbee's argument on ID cards will very likely find widespread agreement: "ID cards may get an easier passage now that they can show a clearer purpose. Where the security services and intelligence plainly failed abysmally to detect any of hte elaborate planning for this atrocity, attention may turn to sterner measures against the hundreds of thousands of foreigners living here illegally." (Guardian, 8 July, p. 23)
More generally, Blair's popularity could well soar if he continues to be seen to have dealt well with the crisis, for reasons noted by James Blitz (FT, July 9/10, p. 13)
The comment pages of the Guardian/Observer have played host to an indirect ongoing discussion about Blair's responsibility for the attacks, with Nick Cohen preaching that because "Islamism was a reactionary movement as great as fascism," and moreover "an autonomous psychopathic force with reasons of its own," no responsibility for the attacks can be laid at the door of Number 10 (or the White House). Gary Younge responded today with a reiteration of the arguments set out by Ali, Fisk and Hiro. I doubt this debate will generate much interest - particularly as it was done to death in the weeks after 9/11. Perhaps, if it gains a sufficiently wide audience, the view of Robin Cook will gain some popularity. On Friday, he wrote: "So long as the struggle against terrorism is conceived as a war that can be won by military means, it is doomed to fail...Success will only come from isolating the terrorists and denying them support, funds and recruits, which means focusing more on our common ground with the Muslim world than on what divides us." Not too controversial, but still somewhat at odds with the "war on terror" generally. It won't have much impact, though, unless "attacks" are conceived much more broadly than the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (something on that scale is pretty unlikely for a few years, given the disastrous occupation of Iraq). The "attacks" as many supporters of the jihadis see them, include unflinching support for Israel, the close relationship with Saudi Arabia, and the attempts to undermine the democratic opposition in Iran. A radical reorientation in foreign policy is the natural conclusion to be drawn from Cook's proposals - something very different from the policy he pursued as Foreign Secretary, and something unlikely to emerge under a 'New' Labour government.
Jeffrey Sachs, blogging for the FT, praised Britain's response to the attacks on Friday, saying "There were no pogroms, attacks on London’s large Muslim population, Rather there were statements of praise for the Muslim community, for its integral role in London life. There was no rush to judgment, no bluster, no jingoism, only the steady voices of British politicians directing a democratic response to this most undemocratic of deeds." Others were not so confident - Jonathan Guthrie wrote that "The long-feared assault on the capital is predicted to trigger a resurgence in hostility towards Muslims that followed September 11." (FT, July 8, p. 5), suggesting the next day that "Reprisals [against British Muslims] could create a new generation of radicals" (Roula Khalaf and Jonathan Guthrie, FT, July 9/10, p. 7). Today it emerges that "hate crimes" against Muslims have already resulted in one "serious injury." (James Blitz and Jimmy Burns, FT, July 11, p. 2)
The attacks have almost totally overshadowed coverage of the G8 summit, leaving most ignorant of the lack of substance behind the propagandistic "pledges" on debt, world trade and climate change. "Campaigners who had backed Mr Blair's campaign to increase aid to Africa were disappointed, saying that much of the money was a restatement of existing pledges and that it fell far short of what was needed." (James Blitz, Alan Beattie and Fiona Harvey, FT, 9/10 July, p. 1). Reports on the agreements give ample scope for disappointment, but it is likely to remain confined to campaigners - the millions who enjoyed Live 8 are unlikely to notice their complaints in the sparse coverage. Dramatic progress in the near future seems rather unlikely, as WTO director-general Supachai Panitchpakdi warned "progress [on trade negotiations] is nowhere near sufficient in terms of our critical path to Hong Kong," which will host a WTO meeting in December. (Alan Beattie, FT, July 9/10, p. 8) If the already existing agenda of the Doha round cannot be agreed, then agreement on radical moves to seriously reduce poverty in the world's poorest countries look pretty unlikely - perhaps one reason for the weak deals made this week.
A more critical perspective might describe the whole affair as a sham.
Finally, two articles - one short one and one longer one - from Jason Burke, who well deserves his description on the Guardian website as "The world's leading expert on al-Qaeda." " Fundamentally, this is an amateurish, lo-tech operation. It indicates a small group who did what they could with limited resources available," he reckons. In this case, hopefully organising any more attacks in the near future will be beyond their capacity - we can only hope so.
posted by UK plc at 4:23 PM
4 Comments:
Very cool site.
I'll be adding this to my blog list.
I did a post on the terrorist bombings as well.
http://politicalnotio.blogspot.com/2005/07/response-to-terrorism.html
When you get some time, check it out.
Glad to hear the Brits are still holding strong.
I'm surprised that the states haven't been hit again yet.
Si,
Does all this bluster in britain not simply serve to obfuscate the real power relationship in the response to these attacks viz. that of the US to Britain? As far as I can see, US internal security is happy to spend more time/ money protecting "homeland" security, and making a repeat of 9/11 unlikely (given "Al-Quaeda's current operative capacity). As such it seems to me that Blair, who was already, and now remains, terrified of attacks on Britain will find that his two options remain the same. The first is to follow the Spanish lead; the second to continue standing shoulder to shoulder with the US in the war on terror. Since I don't believe the US security services do not believe themselves to be on top of the threat of a further attack, and since it is inconceivable that regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq have anything to do with what the public is led to believe the "war on terror" is, Britain is being led up a blind alley. The US gets legitimacy (if only a bit) from its European allies: meanwhile US foreign policy objectives seem to be concerned with managing US relations with the Third World, along the lines of the Guatemala model. Blair's problem is that he cannot admit that Iraq since 1991 has been about oil (which would have been a perfectly good reason to go to war the first time from agovernmental point of view), so he has to maintain it was about the war on terror. That means he really will eb Bush's pooch: brought along into subsequent US interventions in parts of the world they think need managing. The political and media consensus that this is about Islamic extremeism is worrying: we could easily devote energy to successfully defeating Islamic extremeism in Britain if we were not distracted by America's strategic wars.
On ID cards: Charles Clarke (who does not seem committed to the scheme for all his anti LSE bluster) has said ID cards would have made no difference. The left needs to unify its voice against authoritarianism as the best way to defeat domestic terrorism (as a cursory look at the recent history of the IRA suggests).
All of this brings us to the question of how British foreign policy is formulated. Iraq has been "all about oil" since 1914. Militarism generally is pretty important to Britain's economy - not on the scale of the US, obviously, but still.
So what we need to ask ourselves is, where is the driving force coming from? Does Blair decide if we go to war? Who else has a say? What kinds of pressures are there affecting such a decision? These are complex questions, and I think the answer lies a lot deeper than a quest for security.
Is Blair really terrified of Al Qaeda attacking the UK? New Labour rhetoric aside, all the experts predicted that involvement in the invasion of Iraq would increase the threat of terrorism to the UK - can Blair really have refused to believe it?
I think it's mistaken to say we are failing to defeat Islamic extremism because we are "distracted" by America's strategic wars. It's the wrong way of looking at it entirely. By occupying Iraq, by unflinching support for Israel's occupation over the Palestinians, by stifling the democratic opposition in Iran and so on, we are doing a huge amount to fuel Islamic extremism, and the notion of a Clash of Civilizations - the shared aim of people like Samuel Huntington and bin Laden.
You're right about what Clarke said, but note that meanwhile, wide-reaching anti-terror legislation is being rushed through, apparently set to include such ludicrous offences as "glorifying acts of terrorism." Applying that one without having Mr Blair the first to be prosecuted, will require considerable discipline.
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