Bogeyman Putin

Vladimir Putin is in some danger of becoming the new Saddam - the man everybody loves to hate. By now, academic commentary on Putin's authoritarianism fits a well-established mould, invoking a key series of events. A typical example is the summary with which Marie-Elisabeth Baudoin introduced a recent article in one of the field's leading journals:
"The takeover of NTV by Gazprom in 2001, the Yukos case and the arrest of Mikhail Khodorkovskii in 2003, followed by the move to select governors by presidential appointment in 2004, are among the many indicators of a tightening of the authoritarian character of the Russian political regime since 2000." (Marie-Elisabeth Baudoin, "Is the Constitutional Court the last bastion in Russia against the threat of authoritarianism?" Europe-Asia Studies 58.5, July 2006). In the twelve months since the article was published, further examples have drawn considerable attention in the Western media: the assasinations of Anna Politkovskaya and Alexander Litvinenko, violent breakups of democratic protests, including the arrest of leading opposition figures (most prominently, Garry Kasparov) combined with foreign policy moves which have been regarded as 'aggressive' at best by Western commentators: threats to cut off natural gas supplies to neighbouring states, plans for new oil and gas pipelines, the moves to push out foreign gas and oil companies in favour of Gazprom, the conduct of the row over the Estonian war memorial, and the casual (so far) dismissal of British requests for the extradition of Andrei Lugovoi over the Litvinenko affair.
Criticism of the Putin regime is becoming something to which a good number of academics seem to be able to devote their lives, and the level of commitment which this has reached is exemplified by the warm reception of a recent book by John Dunlop which makes allegations about Russia's relations with Chechen extremists that would surely have been dismissed as outlandish had they been made a few years ago. Specifically, Dunlop suggests that Russian government agencies conspired with Chechen extremists to prevent the formation of a political settlement or ceasefire in 2002, and blocked any opportunity for meaningful negotiation during the 2004 Beslan siege. (John B. Dunlop, The 2002 Dubrovka and 2004 Beslan Hostage Crises: A Critique of Russian Counter-terrorism. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006; See glowing reviews in Russian Review 66.2 (April 2007) pp. 346-347 and Europe-Asia Studies 59.1 (Jan 2007) pp. 163-168).
As tensions between Russia and Europe rise, the media has got in on the act, especially in the last 12 months. There appears to be a self-reinforcing consesus forming that Putin has formed a terror state, and is threatening Russia's future.
In the most recent issue of New Left Review, Vladimir Popov strikees a rare note of dissent, concluding that (by the economic and social indicators he was examining) "Russia is in better shape today than seven years ago, when Putin assumed power...Strengthening law and order is only possible under a centralized system. Without centralization, there is no chance at all of it happening;http://www.blogger.com/img/gl.link.gif unbounded chaos and lawlessness would rule." (Vladimir Popov, "Russia Redux?" New Left Review NS 44 (March/April 2007)
The point here is that Russia is stabilizing under Putin, and although there are a great many problems and dangers that go along with political centralization, it is important to identify those improvements that have been made. Most specifically, what is missing from too much of the recent commentary is recognition of the absolute calamity of the Yeltsin era, when an explosion of criminality (and semi-criminal profiteering) and economic collapse shook the country. It is necessary to ask why Putin is getting so much more criticism than Yeltsin ever did from Western governments and media. It is not too difficult to find the principle at work (which is close to universal). The criterion is not the welfare of Russia's citizens - which is, as usual, simply a pretext - but rather the 'interests' of Western governments - ie investment opportunities. It is Putin's refusal to play the neoliberal game of "open markets" that is the real cause for all of this criticism, and it is necessary that academics take this in to account. It is, of course, important that the abuses of Putin's government are documented, so that pressure might be exerted on it to curb them - and there are surely few better examples than in foreign policy, although the Chechnya situation continues to recieve much less attention thatn it deserves. But let us not be led in to the trap which would have us pining for the Yeltsin years - those who do so surely cannot expect to be taken seriously when they profess concern for the welfare of the Russian people. Putin is not by any means the only menace threatening Russia, and the academy has a grave responsibility to remember this.